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I. INTRODUCTION
It is often pointed out that while the United States Supreme Court is the
final arbiter in setting antitrust policy and promulgating antitrust rules, it does
so too infrequently to be an efficient regulator.' And since the antitrust
agencies, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and the Antitrust Division
of the Department ofJustice ("DOJ"), rarely issue guidelines, and even more
rarely issue rules or regulations, very little antitrust law is handed down from
on high. Instead, circuits split, and lower courts must muddle through new
antitrust problems by finding analogies in technologically and socially
obsolete precedents.
When faced with this void of authority, especially covering cutting-edge
antitrust issues raised by new technology and business arrangements, lower
courts often turn to a single treatise, Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles and Their Application, by the late Philip E. Areeda and Herbert
Hovenkamp.2 The treatise's influence is such thatJustice Breyer has remarked
"that most practitioners would prefer to have two paragraphs of Areeda's
treatise on their side than three Courts of Appeals or four Supreme Court
Justices."3 Why courts are so influenced by the treatise is no secret: It is up-to-
date, technologically savvy, politically middle-of-the-road, economically
literate, comprehensible, and comprehensive. The monopoly that Professor
Hovenkamp (as the only living editor of the treatise) has inherited and
lovingly maintains is certainly the kind of which antitrust would approve: It is
a monopoly "thrust upon it"4 by simply being the best. But its dominance in
lower courts and, therefore, in firm decision-making, should raise concerns
1. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION 4
(2005) ("Lack of adequate Supreme Court supervision has led to many divisions among the
federal courts of appeal.").
2. See generally Hillary Greene & D. Daniel Sokol, Judicial Treatment of the Antitrust Treatise,
Io IOWA L. REV. 2039 (2015).
3. Stephen Breyer, In Memariam: Phillip E. Areeda 509 iHARV. L. REv. 889, 89o0 (1996).
4. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 429 (2d Cir. 1945).
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among those who believe it was Congress's intent to put the courts, not a
professor, in charge of antitrust policy.
The solution, of course, is not to force the lower courts away from the
Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise; in the absence of binding authority, reliance on
such a fine treatise can only improve antitrustjurisprudence. But this reliance
may illustrate the need for institutional reform. It suggests that something
should be done to solve the bottleneck problem at the Supreme Court and to
encourage the antitrust agencies to issue more rules to guide firms in their
business deals and lower courts in their resolution of disputes. This Essay
explores the structural and institutional causes of the void of antitrust
authority, explains how the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise fills that gap, and
identifies the legitimacy problems that inhere when lower courts treat a
secondary source as speaking for the Supreme Court. Finally, this Essay points
out how a more economically literate bench and Chevron deference to FTC
antitrust rules would help alleviate the problem.
II. THE AREEDA-HOVENKAMP TREATISE IN THE LOWER COURTS
It is difficult to overstate the importance of the Areeda-Hovenkamp
treatise. Whether evaluated quantitatively or qualitatively, the reach that the
treatise has had on antitrust law and policy is staggering. The market power
that Herbert Hovenkamp enjoys over influencing antitrust law in the courts is
honestly gained, but no one can argue that he enjoys anything short of a
monopoly.
A. THE TREATISE BY THE NUMBERS
The modern treatise-a 2 i-volume set, updated semiannually, 5950
pages long, and retailing for $4 225 5--takes its origins in a three-volume set
published by Harvard antitrust legends Philip E. Areeda and Donald F.
Turner in 1978.6 Under the Areeda-Turner brand, it has been cited in over
5oo federal cases;7 under the Areeda-Hovenkamp title, which was obtained
after Professor Hovenkamp replaced Professor Turner in 1989, it has been
cited in another 700.8 Many opinions cite the treatise repeatedly.9 That makes
5. Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and Their Application, WOLTERS KLUWER,
http://www.wklawbusiness.com/store/products/antitrust-law-analysis-antitrust-principles-their-
application-prod-o73556428o/hardcover-item-1-o73556428o (last visited Apr. 15, 2015)
(retailing the treatise online).
6. Thomas W. Rhodes, Book Review, 13 GA. L. REV. 11 10, 11 10 (1979) (reviewing the
original edition of the treatise).
7. A Westlaw search restricted to federal district and appellate courts for [Areeda /4
Turner / 1 o "antitrust law"] yields 602 cases as of March 23, 2015.
8. A Westlaw search restricted to federal district and appellate courts for [Areeda /4
Hovenkamp/xo "antitrust law"] yields 758 cases as of March 23, 2015.
9. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3 d 1028 (D.C. Cir. 2oo8)
(citing the treatise 13 times); United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3 d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001)
(citing the treatise 12 times).
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the treatise the single most-cited antitrust authority, including such
ubiquitous cases as the Supreme Court's 1918 decision in Chicago Board of
Trade, which established the "Rule of Reason," and the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit's ALCOA case, which defined the offense of
monopolization under the Sherman Act in 1945.-- And it outstrips citations
to antitrust agency materials, including the Merger Guidelines, at a ratio of
three-to-one., As for other treatises, hornbooks, and academic materials,
nothing even comes close. The next most cited academic work on antitrust,
Robert Bork's The Antitrust Paradox, has been cited in only 183 federal district
and appellate court cases.' 2
B. OTHER MEASURES OFINFLUENCE
Qualitative analysis of the citations confirms the impression given by the
numbers: The treatise is an essential source of antitrust authority at all levels
of federal practice. Courts commonly quote portions of the treatise at length,
setting apart passages as block quotes rather than rephrasing the point.l1 And
courts will often explicitly adopt propositions offered by the treatise as law.
For example, in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit's Microsoft case,
the court adopted the treatise's position on structural relief in vacating the
remedy below and cautioning against a heavy-handed structural remedy on
remand.'4 Likewise, in LePage's Inc. v. 3 M, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit adopted the treatise's position that a competitor offering a
broader range of products can use bundled discounting to exclude an equally
efficient rival.,5 Another case even used the treatise's language to name a
section heading: "Plaintiff Fits Areeda and Hovenkamp's Description of 'A
Nascent Firm."" 6
io. According to Westlaw, Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231
(1918), has been cited by federal courts in 66o cases as of March 23, 2015, and United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), has been cited in 839.
ii. A Westlaw search restricted to federal district and appellate courts for ["merger
guidelines"] yields 253 cases as of March 23, 2015. Similar searches for each of the otherjoint-
issued FTC and DOJ guidelines yield a total of 62 citations.
12. This Westlaw search was restricted to federal district and appellate courts for ["antitrust
paradox" /1 o Bork]. In comparison, a Westlaw search restricted to federal district and appellate
courts for [Areeda /4 Hovenkamp /lo "antitrust law"] yields 758 cases as of March 23, 2015.
13. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3 d 254, 271, 322-23 (3 d Cir. 2012)
(quoting approximately 990 words from the treatise in only three block quotes found between
the majority and dissenting opinions).
14. See Microsoft, 253 F.3 d at 107. The opinion cites the treatise's passages on structural relief
three times. Id. at 105-07.
15. LePage's Inc. v. 3 M, 324 F.3 d 141, 155 (3d Cir. 2003). For another example of courts
explicitly adopting the treatise's position on a particular point of law, see A.A. Poultry Farms, Inc.
v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1402 (7th Cir. 1989) ("Professors Areeda and
Hovenkamp therefore suggest that intent be removed as a subject in predatory pricing cases, and
we are persuaded that this is the right approach." (citation omitted)).
16. Z-Tel Commc'ns, Inc. v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 2d 513, 532 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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Judicial references to the treatise are glowing; in addition to Justice
Breyer's high praise quoted above, it is not uncommon for courts, in citing
the treatise, to comment on its high quality or accessibility.'7 The depth of the
treatise's influence is complemented by its breadth, and it is cited for a wide
range of ideas. Although often cited for a succinct restatement of the law,' 8 it
is also treated as authoritative on antitrust policy,'9 relevant economic
concepts,20 and on the state of lower court disagreement about particular
issues. 2 ' Even its prescriptive positions-advocating a change in the law or a
resolution to a circuit split-have frequently found traction in the courts.2 2 It
would seem that an early review of the treatise made an accurate prediction
when it praised it thus:
In the tradition of classic encyclopedias like Wigmore's and
Williston's, it is both a monument and an indispensable guide. Its
magisterial pronouncements will, for a generation, be the starting
point of research by practitioners, judges, and students of law and
industrial organization.23
Arguably, the flaw in this prediction was that it did not go far enough. It has
been for two generations, not one, that the treatise has provided the starting
point-and in many cases the final analysis-for antitrust practitioners and
judges.
17. See, e.g., United States v. LSL Biotechnologies, 379 F-3 d 672, 689 (9 th Cir. 2004)
(referring to Areeda and Hovenkamp as "distinguished commentators"); Dee-K Enters., Inc. v.
Heveafil Sdn. Bhd, 299 F. 3 d 281, 293 (4 th Cir. 2002) (referring to the treatise as a "noted
commentary"); Town of Norwood, Mass. v. New Eng. Power Co., 202 F.3 d 4o8, 418 (ist Cir.
2000) (adopting "a view endorsed in some measure by several circuits and by the always
enlightening Areeda treatise" (citations omitted)).
I8. See, e.g., Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3 d 1494, 15o9-1o (9 th Cir. 1996) (quoting the
treatise for the law of antitrust standing).
19. See, e.g., Andrx Pharm., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int'l, 256 F.3 d 799, 805 (D.C. Cir. 2OO )
(citing the treatise's explanation for the private right of action and treble damages in antitrust);
Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3 d 979, 1001 (9 th Cir. 2000) (endorsing
Areeda-Hovenkamp'sjustification for the antitrust injury doctrine); C.R. Bard, Inc. v. M 3 Sys.,
Inc., 157 F. 3 d 1340, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting an Areeda-Hovenkamp claim that a rule
holding some innovation predatory would be inadministrable).
20. See, e.g., U.S. Anchor Mfg., Inc. v. Rule Indus., Inc., 7 F. 3 d 986, 998 (1 ith Cir. 1993)
(citing the treatise for the idea that brand loyalty may facilitate monopolization by allowing price
discrimination).
21. See, e.g., Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428 F. 3 d 408, 437 (2d Cir. 2005); A.A.
Poultry Farms, Inc. v. Rose Acre Farms, Inc., 881 F.2d 1396, 1404 (7 th Cir. 1989).
22. See, e.g., Globetrotter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Grp., Inc., 362 F.3 d 1367, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2004); Automated Salvage Transp., Inc. v. Wheelabrator Envtl. Sys., Inc., 155 F. 3 d 59,
70 (2d Cir. 1998).
23. Louis B. Schwartz, Book Review, On the Uses of Economics: A Review of the Antitrust Treatises,
128 U. PA. L. REV. 244, 246 (1979) (reviewing PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTITRUST
LAW (1978) and LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST (1977)).
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III. ACCOUNTING FOR THE DOMINANCE OF THE AREEDA-HOVENKAMP TREATISE
It is easy to conclude that the superior quality of the Areeda-Hovenkamp
treatise (which is what I shall call it because that is what it is today and what it
has been for more than twice as long as it was the Areeda-Turner treatise) has
contributed to its influence. But it is equally clear that the success of the
treatise has something to do with the state of antitrust law itself. I will discuss
the merits of the treatise in Subparts A through C and what I call the "law
vacuum hypothesis" in Subpart D.
A. CLEAR AND COMPREHENSIVE
The treatise is extremely clear. The complexity of antitrust law is second
only to the complexity of the economics on which it is based, and the Areeda-
Hovenkamp treatise deals with both masterfully. It is honest about confusion
in the lower courts and offers its own solutions for simplicity. It breaks down
technical economic arguments for a lay or legal audience without
oversimplifying to the point of being unhelpful. It merges its roles as antitrust
hornbook, economics textbook, and policy guide seamlessly. It demystifies the
alchemy of econometrics and statistical inference for lawyers and judges who
are understandably worried about being bamboozled by economists in the
courtroom.
And the treatise is comprehensive. It covers everything from substantive
antitrust law to questions about how expert evidence, litigation procedure,
remedies, and statutory exemptions impact the practice of antitrust law. It
collects thousands of lower court cases and summarizes their takes on
contested points of law. The authors carefully navigate jurisdictional divides
on many difficult issues, and they bring the law up-to-date in areas where
technology and new markets have created ambiguity in the doctrine. Simply
put, anything you want on antitrust-from case law to policy to economics,
from misuse of patents to market definitions to a historical account of the
FTC-can be found in the treatise. It is probably no accident that a single-
volume treatise,24 published the year before the original three-volume
Areeda-Turner treatise, has not gained the same level of influence. At 21
volumes, the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise proves that size matters.
B. RIGHT TIME, RIGHT PLACE
Its timing was perfect. The original Antitrust Law: An Analysis of Antitrust
Principles and Their Application was published in 1978, at an opportunistic
moment in the development of antitrust law. In the decade before, Richard
Posner had forcefully,25 and Robert Bork stridently, 6 argued for a purely
economic standard to govern antitrust law. The Supreme Court in 1977
24. See generally SULLIVAN, supra note 23.
25. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1976).
26. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICYATWARWITH ITSELF (1978).
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handed these professors the first win in what would become the antitrust
revolution when it decided Continental T.V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.27
according to the "Chicago School" paradigm. But despite this early interest in
wedding economic principles to antitrust law, most of the Chicago School's
ideas were too far afield from existing antitrust law-and perhaps too
politically extreme-for easy judicial adoption. Enter the Areeda-Turner
treatise, which grafted economic thinking onto existing antitrust doctrine in
a way that was both more moderate and more workable than the scholarly
proposals offered by professors like Bork and Posner.
C. A UTHORAL PEDIGREE
The intellectual stature of its authors also contributed to its widespread
adoption. Like Wright and Miller's Federal Practice and Procedure, Wigmore on
Evidence, and Corbin on Contracts, the treatise derives much of its persuasive
power from the personalities behind it. Phillip Areeda was a distinguished
Harvard Law professor for 34 years, after serving as special counsel to
President Eisenhower. 2s He educated two generations of lawyers and scholars
in the new economic paradigm of antitrust law. When he died, he was
remembered as "the country's foremost specialist on antitrust legislation."29
Donald Turner had also held a high-level government position, serving as the
head of the Antitrust Division of the DOJ under President Johnson, before
joining the Harvard Law faculty.3o Holding both a Ph.D. in economics and a
J.D., Professor Turner held special sway in the newly interdisciplinary field of
antitrust.3'
And this intellectual pedigree has certainly been maintained. The
Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise could now more accurately be called the
Hovenkamp treatise because Phillip Areeda died just six years after Professor
Hovenkamp joined as an editor, and Donald Turner died the year before
that.32 Thus, for almost two decades, Professor Hovenkamp has been the sole
custodian of the now 21-volume treatise.s3
27. Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 66,69 (1977) (citing Richard Posner
and Robert Bork in the opinion).
28. David Binder, Philip Areeda, Considered Top Authority on Antitrust Law, Dies at 65, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 27, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/12/27/us/phillip-areeda-considered-top-authority-
on-antiu-ust-law-dies-at-65 .html.
29. Id.
30. Wolfgang Saxon, Donald Turner, Lawyer for U.S. and Writer, 73, N.Y. TIMES (July 22, 1994),
http://www.nytimes.com/1 99 4 /07/22/obituaries/donald-turner-lawyer-for-us-and-writer-73.html.
31. Id.
32. Indeed, it is not uncommon for courts to shorten the citation simply to "Hovenkamp"
followed by the paragraph number and page. See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3 d 254,
275, 277, 287 (3 d Cir. 2012 ); In reTerazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1279,
1300 (S.D. Fla. 2005) (referring to the treatise within the opinion as the "Hovenkamp treatise").
33. With the exceptions in the third edition of co-authors Roger D. Blair and Christine
Piette Durrance in volume IIA andJohn L. Solow in volume IIB.
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Undoubtedly-indeed, hopefully-much of the work of collecting cases
and updating its content for the frequent supplements falls on research
assistants; nevertheless, the mark of Professor Hovenkamp's expertise and
intellectual dexterity dominates the treatise. The style is scholarly, meticulous,
clear, and careful, and is reflected in his impressive body of work beyond the
treatise. Professor Hovenkamp has written over ioo law review articles, and,
in addition to the treatise, 14 books. In keeping with the treatise's tradition
of interdisciplinarity, Professor Hovenkamp has written enough in
constitutional law, legal history, intellectual property, and, of course, antitrust
law to qualify for tenure in each of those fields individually. A conservative
estimate of his academic citations, excluding the treatise, is about 2700.34
D. THE LAW VACUUM HYPOTHESIS
Thus far, the explanation for the dominance of the treatise brings to
mind the words of Learned Hand in ALCOA: "A single producer may be the
survivor out of a group of active competitors, merely by virtue of his superior
skill, foresight and industry."35 "[F]inis opus coronat," indeed.36 But it is not
enough to say that Areeda, Hovenkamp, and Turner got there first and did it
best. The dominance of the treatise is not only unique in its influence within
antitrust law, but-with perhaps the exception of Wright and Miller in the
field of civil procedure-it is unique to all areas of law.37 Certainly there are
talented scholars with a great sense of timing in every legal field, but outside
of civil procedure, it is difficult to think of a single area of law where one
treatise exercises the same degree of influence as the Areeda-Hovenkamp
treatise does in antitrust. So, in addition to the merits of the treatise and its
authors, we must look to the ecology of antitrust law to understand how such
a creature as the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise has thrived.
i. Describing the Law Vacuum Hypothesis: Why So Many Gaps?
The law vacuum hypothesis posits that antitrust law suffers from a lack of
guidance from on high-either from the Supreme Court or the agencies
tasked with making and enforcing antitrust law-which creates a legal void
that is naturally filled with the kind of comprehensive and coherent academic
34. I arrived at this estimate by taking the total number of pieces citing Professor
Hovenkamp's work and subtracting those citing the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise. So, because
searching Westlaw's "Law Reviews [and] Journals" database for [Areeda /4 Hovenkamp /1t
"antitrust law"] yields 1350 citations, and searching the same database for [Herbert /3
Hovenkamp] yields 4140, I arrived at an estimate of 2700. It is conservative because it excludes
pieces, which are probably numerous, that cite to both the treatise and at least one other piece
by Hovenkamp.
35. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d Cir. 1945).
36. Id.
37. Also, the Wright and Miller treatise does not enjoy a monopoly, but must share its market
with the also dominant Moore's Manual. See generally MOORE ET AL., MOORE's MANUAL: FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2014) (multivolume treatise with multiple editions and updates).
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treatment that the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise offers. The Supreme Court,
which is already poorly positioned to make comprehensive and up-to-date
antitrust rules, has only recently begun to grant certiorari in a significant
number of antitrust cases, ending a two-decade antitrust dry spell.38 Even at
this brisker pace of granting certiorari in antitrust cases, it is not clear that the
Court will be able to make up for lost ground. The federal agencies tasked
with antitrust norm creation and enforcement-the FrC and the DOJ-have
long focused much more energy on the enforcement of antitrust rules rather
than their creation.39 These two forces have combined to leave lower courts
without a clear rule of decision for many common antitrust disputes.
As I have argued elsewhere, the Supreme Court is an inefficient regulator
of antitrust both because it is inexpert and because its docket limitations
preclude deciding as many cases as would be necessary to provide adequate
guidance to businesses in a fast-changing economy.4o The Court's lack of
economic expertise leads it to wait before resolving pressing antitrust
regulatory issues that depend on emerging academic debates.4, The Court
quite reasonably waits for an academic consensus to emerge, but in doing so,
it leaves longstanding debates in lower courts unresolved and scientifically
outmoded precedent on the books.42
The docket limitations on the Supreme Court preclude it from creating
an extensive set of specific antitrust norms covering all commonly arising fact
patterns. At most, the Court decides a few cases a year, in contrast to the courts
of appeals that "decide between fifty and eighty important antitrust cases per
year."43 These decisions operate as the law of their land since the Supreme
Court frequently declines review.44 Although the Roberts Court has granted
certiorari in several antitrust cases each year, the Rehnquist Court heard very
few antitrust cases at all.
Professor Hovenkamp himself observed that there is a significant lack of
guidance on antitrust policy from the Supreme Court. He cites "a reduction
in the Supreme Court's supervisory role and.., a growing amount of conflict
among the lower federal courts" as the consequences of a light Supreme
Court antitrust docket in the 1990s and early 2000s.45 Thus, he observes,
38. See HOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 6.
39. See infra notes 48-55.
40. See generally Rebecca Haw, Amicus Briefs and the Sherman Act: Why Antitrust Needs a New
Deal, 89 TEX. L. REv. 1247 (20 11) [hereinafter Haw, Amicus Briefs]; Rebecca Haw, Delay and Its
Benefits for Judicial Rulemaking Under Scientific Uncertainty, 55 B.C. L. REV. 331 (2014) [hereinafter
Haw, Delay].
41. See Haw, Delay, supra note 40, at 332.
42. See id.
43- HOVENKAMP, supra note I, at 6.
44- Id.




"[T] he task of making antitrust rules largely befalls the federal courts of
appeals."46
In theory, the law vacuum could be filled with legislative and regulatory
activity, as in the case of environmental law or financial regulation, but
Congress has been essentially silent on antitrust law for many decades. And
partly because of an accident of institutional design and partly because of path
dependency, neither antitrust agency makes many authoritative rules or
regulations. The DOJ has no formal norm-creation role, although it can
influence policy by choosing cases and taking litigation positions. Here,
however, its influence is circumscribed by the many private suits under the
Sherman Act, which account for the vast majority of antitrust cases decided
and over which the DOJ exercises no control.47
The FTC is also limited in its ability to create norms. The Sherman Act,
unlike most modern regulatory statutes, does not delegate rulemaking to any
agency, but section 5 of the FTC Act gives the FTC the power to create rules
pertaining to competition.48 One colorable interpretation of section 5 is that
the FTC has the power to create competition law whole-cloth without regard
to the Sherman Act and how the Court has interpreted it. But since this
interpretation would create two parallel sets of laws depending on who is the
litigant (section 5 of the FTC Act for the FTC and the Sherman Act for private
parties and the DOJ), the interpretation has understandably gone by the
wayside.49 Today, such an aggressive interpretation of section 5 would simply
have no traction in the courts.50
Even the idea that the FTC could "invoke[] an independent [s] ection 5"
to add to or supplement the laws under the Sherman Act has been met with
resistance from the courts.5' In Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit overturned an FTC decision holding that
under section 5, reverse-settlement payments over $2 million are
presumptively anticompetitive.52 The 2005 case hearkened back to an early
decision made shortly after the creation of the FTC Act in which the Supreme
Court observed: "The words 'unfair method of competition' are not defined
by the statute and their exact meaning is in dispute. It is for the courts, not
the commission, ultimately to determine as matter of law what they include."53
46. HOVENKAMP, supra note 1, at 6; see also Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust
Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 49, 56 (2007).
47. See CRANE, supra note 45, at 63-65.
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012).
49. CRANE, supra note 45, at 135-36.
50. See Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
761, 766 (2005) ("It used to be thought that 'unfair methods of competition' swept further than
the practices forbidden by the Sherman and Clayton Acts . . . but [this point] is no longer
tenable.").
51 . CRANE, supra note 45, at 136.
52. Shering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3 d 1o56, s o58, o62 (I 1th Cir. 2005).
53. Fed. Trade Comm'nv. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 427 (1920).
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Professor Daniel Crane has cited this and other examples of the Court's
jurisdiction jealousy as a reason for the FTC's timid use of its section 5 norm-
creation powers.54
Thus, as a practical matter, the FTC's and the DOJ's norm-creation
functions are limited to creating enforcement policies concerning the norms
they hope to influence through litigation. In the case of the jointly issued
Merger Guidelines, these signals are very strong and provide valuable
persuasive authority to parties who want to know when their conduct is likely
to run afoul of the antitrust laws.55 Indeed, the Merger Guidelines have been
cited by appellate and district court decisions almost 250 times since they were
created.56 And because the Supreme Court has not decided a merger case in
several decades, the Merger Guidelines are for all practical purposes the law
on merger liability. But the Merger Guidelines are the exceptional case.
Although the FTC and the DOJ have jointly issued several other guidelines,
including ones for collaborations among competitors and the licensing of
intellectual property, they have been cited only a handful of times each.57
2. Testing the Law Vacuum Hypothesis: Areeda-Hovenkamp Fills in the
Gaps
Nature abhors a vacuum; where there is no law handed down from on
high, intelligent scholarship will fill the void, and it has been so in the field of
antitrust.5s Identifying the major contributions of the Areeda-Hovenkamp
treatise to antitrust law in the lower courts is a daunting task because of an
embarrassment-of-riches problem. A comprehensive treatment of where the
treatise has influenced judicial decision-making would be much longer than
any essay of reasonable length, and so I must choose only a few important
examples. Here, I will discuss the role that the treatise has played in
determining the law of loyalty discounts and the international reach of the
54. Daniel A. Crane, Technocracy and Antitrust, 86 TEx. L. REV. 1159, 1199-2o8 (2008).
55. For an excellent discussion of the Merger Guidelines and their role in antitrust norm
creation, see generally Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization: The Role of the Merger Guidelines
in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771 (2oo6).
56. A Westlaw search restricted to federal district courts and courts of appeals for ["merger
guidelines"] yields 253 cases as of March 23, 2015.
57. For example, among all the non-Merger Guidelines cited on Weslaw, the ["Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property"] has been cited by the most lower federal
court cases, at 25. The next most cited is the ["Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among
Competitors"] with eight federal lower court citations.
58. This phenomenon can also be observed in international law, where binding law from on
high is scarce. There, scholarship enjoys a special influence. See William J. Aceves, Symposium
Introduction: Scholarship as Evidence ofInternationalLaw, 26 LOY. L.A. INT'L &COMP.L.REV. 1, 1 (2003)
("International law has long-recognized the role of scholarship as a 'subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law.'" (quoting Statute of the International Court ofJustice art. 38() (d),
June 26, 1945, 59 Star. 1055, T.S. No. 993)); id. at 3-5. But seeJack L. Goldsmith, Panel Discussion,
Scholars in the Construction and Critique of International Law, 94 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 317, 318-19
(2000) (downplaying the importance of scholarship in interpreting international law).
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Sherman Act. In both examples, the Court has yet to rule directly on a set of
important issues, and so the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise remains a central
authority.
a. Loyalty Discounts and the Areeda-Hovenkamp Treatise
The law of loyalty discounts awkwardly straddles the Court's
jurisprudence on predatory pricing, tying, and exclusive dealing, and the
treatise provides a cogent explanation of the law on each and the important
economic differences between the practices.59 Loyalty discounts come in
several different forms, including volume discounts (price cuts or rebates
based on total amount of product purchased); market share discounts (price
cuts or rebates based on the percentage of a customer's requirements
purchased from the seller); and multi-product bundling (discounts based on
a purchaser buying several different products from a seller).6o Whether for
things the treatise actually says or things that courts wish the treatise had said,
Areeda-Hovenkamp has been cited heavily in lower court opinions treating
loyalty discount claims.
In ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp.,6' the Third Circuit (between the
majority and dissent) cited the treatise 12 times. Some of these citations are
for uncontroversial points of law,62 but more interestingly, the court used the
treatise to support its use of rather contested economic theories and for
explications of antitrust policy. For example, the majority cited the treatise for
a hypothetical that illustrates one way in which "a dominant firm [can]
foreclose rival suppliers."6 And the majority also seems to have adopted the
treatise's position on whether exclusive-dealing cases are theoretically distinct
from de facto exclusive deals achieved through discounting.64 The dissent
quoted an entire passage from the treatise, urging the Areeda-Hovenkamp
position that above-cost discounting is lawful under both sections one and two
59. See, e.g., 3 B PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS
OFANTITRUST PRINCIPLESAND THEIRAPPLICATION 768b 4 , at 167 (3 d ed. 2oo8) (distinguishing
market share discounts from exclusive dealing); see also 1 1 id. I s8oob, at 7 (distinguishing
exclusive dealing and tying).
6o. See Daniel A. Crane, Bargaining overLoyalty, 92 TEX. L. REV. 253, 257-58 (2013).
61. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F. 3 d 254 (3d Cir. 2012).
62. See, e.g., id. at 270, 287.
63. Id. at 271 (citing i 1AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, 18o2c, at 76-77).
64. See id. at 277 (citing ii AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, 18o7b, at 134). I say
"seems" because it appears that the court may have misunderstood the Areeda-Hovenkamp point
here. Compare id. ("That [Eaton's low prices may have induced OEMs to enter long-term
agreements] is not irrelevant, as it may help explain why the OEMs agreed to otherwise
unfavorable terms and it may help to rebut an argument that the agreements were inefficient."),
with is AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, 1 18o7b, at 134 ("[T] he fact that the inducement
to agree to exclusive dealing is a price discount may not be completely irrelevant .... [I]n
explaining why a buyer has agreed to exclusive dealing[,] the discount policy may render
alternative efficiency explanations less likely.... .").
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of the Sherman Act.65 Thus, both the majority and the dissent turned to the
treatise to answer what at least the majority believed was a question left open
by the Supreme Court: Does some above-cost discounting run afoul of the
antitrust laws? And the fact that the Supreme Court subsequently denied
certiorari to the ZFMeritar case 66 means that the uncertainty will prevail. 67
The treatise has proved highly influential in addressing another question
raised by loyalty discounts: How should courts calculate whether a bundle of
two or more different products is priced below cost? This question arose in
the Third Circuit's LePage's Inc. v. 3 M, and the court cited the treatise
extensively to support its holding that 3M's bundled rebates could sustain a
Sherman Act section two monopolization charge. 68 As in ZFMeritor, both the
majority and the dissent cited the treatise, although it was the majority who
relied most heavily on it, claiming that the treatise provided a theoretical basis
for condemning multi-product bundles.
69
LePage's and the legal uncertainty left when the Supreme Court denied
review in that case70 set the stage for the next case in the bundled-cost test
saga. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Cascade Health took
its reliance on the Areeda-Hovenkamp treatise even further than the LePage's
court; the opinion explicitly adopted the cost measurement endorsed by
paragraph 749.71 The case cited the paragraph at length, ultimately adopting
a paraphrase of the rule suggested by the treatise.7 And because the Supreme
Court has not yet weighed in on the appropriate measurement of the cost-
price differential for bundled goods, the Areeda-Hovenkamp test remains
the law in the Ninth Circuit.73
b. The fTAIA and the Hovenkamp Treatise
The Hovenkamp treatise's role is especially striking in the context of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act ("FTAIA"). As in many areas of
law, the treatise is heavily cited in lower court cases interpreting the FTAIA,
which limits the reach of the Sherman Act to domestic violations unless the
65. See ZFMeritor, LLC, 696 F.3 d at 322-24.
66. Eaton Corp. v. ZF Meritor LLC, 133 S. Ct. 2025, 2025-26 (2013) (denying certiorari).
67. For another market share case that relies on the treatise, see Church & Dwight Co. v.
Mayer Labs., Inc., 868 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Cal. 2012), vacated in part by No. C-Lo-4 4 29 EMC,
2012 WL 1745592, at "1 (N.D. Cal. May 16, 2012).
68. LePage's Inc. v. 3 M, 324 F.3 d 141, 147, 155, 157-58 (3 d Cir. 2003).
69. See id. at 155, 158; id. at 176 n.2 (Greenberg, J., dissenting).
70. 3 M Co. v. LePage's Inc., 542 U.S. 953 (2004) (denying certiorari).
71. 3 A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, 749, at 305-49.
72. Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3 d 883, 895, 897, 900, 904-o5, 907-o8
(9 th Cir. 2oo8).
73. For other bundled discount cases relying on the treatise, see Natchitoches Parish Hosp.
Serv. Dist. v. Tyco Int'l Ltd., No. 1:0 5-CV-1 202 4 -PBS, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1o8858, at *19 (D.
Mass. Nov. 20, 2009); Masimo Corp. v. Tyco Health Care Grp., L.P., No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2004
WL 5907538, at *7, *9 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2004).
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challenged conduct abroad "has a direct, substantial, and reasonably
foreseeable effect on domestic commerce."74 In the late 199os, the treatise
essentially played the role of the Supreme Court in resolving a circuit split
about whether courts should apply a per se rule to foreign cartel activity.
In 1996, the Ninth Circuit decided Metro Industries, Inc. v. Sammi Corp.,75
a case challenging a Korean design registration system as effecting a market
division that directly, substantially, and foreseeably affected American
importers. Although the plaintiffs urged per se condemnation of the
defendants' conduct, the court concluded that "where a Sherman Act claim
is based on conduct outside the United States, we apply rule of reason analysis
to determine whether there is a Sherman Act violation."76 The court
reproduced two full paragraphs of text from the first edition of the treatise as
support for that proposition.77 The treatise in 1978 evidently observed that
"the conventional assumptions that courts make in appraising restraints in
domestic markets are not necessarily applicable in foreign markets,"
suggesting, "[fJ or example, price fixing in a foreign country might have some
but very little impact on United States commerce" and so would not be
properly subject to per se condemnation.78
In the next edition of the treatise after Metro Industries was decided,
Professor Hovenkamp clarified the meaning of those passages and explained
that the Metro Industries court had been in error. The 199 7 edition points out
that Metro Industries's use of the "rule of reason treatment for all restraints
abroad [] is squarely in conflict with" precedent in the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit, and "we are inclined to favor the First Circuit's conclusion
over that of the Ninth Circuit."79 Two years later, when the Ninth Circuit had
another occasion to consider the question, it reversed course from its holding
in Metro Industries. It cited the "scholarly criticism" of its previous opinion,
quoting the treatise's observation that "[p]erhaps the [Ninth Circuit's]
conclusion that restraints abroad always require rule of reason analysis would
have been more qualified had the restraint before it belonged more clearly in
the per se category without offsetting considerations of comity."so The Ninth
Circuit, having been set straight by Professor Hovenkamp and his treatise,
74. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 159 (2004) (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 6a(1) (A)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 82 F.3 d 839 (9 th Cir. 1996).
76. Id. at 845.
77- Id.
78. Id. (alteration in original omitted) (quoting 1 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 23, 237
(1978)).
79. 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAw: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION 27 3 b , at 378-79 (1997).
8o. United States v. Hui Hsiung, 758 F.3 d 1074, 1o85 (9 th Cir. 2014) (quoting iB AREEDA
& HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, 27 3 b, at 332) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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limited Metro Industries to its facts and "reiterat[ed] the applicability of the per
se rule for horizontal price-fixing," even in cases originating abroad.8 '
Note how in this controversy the treatise functioned as a stand-in for the
Supreme Court, which had denied certiorari to resolve the issue82 A lower
court created a circuit split, which was recognized and discussed extensively
by the treatise. The treatise handed down an opinion about the appropriate
resolution to the conflict. The circuit subsequently recognized its error and
conformed its precedent not only to the other circuits but to the treatise itself.
In the absence of a Supreme Court opinion, it appears that the treatise spoke
with almost equal authority.
IV. THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE
Is there anything wrong with lower courts using the treatise as an
authority instead of having guidance from on high? Perhaps the treatise
merely predicts the future opinions of the Supreme Court and actions by the
agencies and thus is merely an oracle of antitrust law and policy. On this view,
the law vacuum problem is not so serious: In the interim between when a new
antitrust problem arises and the authorities speak, parties can use the treatise
to predict the eventual actions of antitrust authorities to organize their
business affairs and legal disputes. Thus, the treatise's role in filling the gaps
is relatively unproblematic. On this view, there is nothing democratically or
institutionally illegitimate about the use of the treatise in lower courts since
ratification by the Supreme Court is all but sure to follow.
This argument has two significant weaknesses. First, the treatise does
seem to drive, and not merely predict, antitrust law at the Supreme Court. In
the few antitrust cases decided by the Supreme Court, the treatise plays as
large a role-if not larger-than it does in the lower courts. Second, the
argument assumes that the Supreme Court and the agencies can and do
eventually act to ratify or clarify the treatise's position on important antitrust
debates. In fact, the Court decides too few cases, and the agencies exercise
too few opportunities to express a position on antitrust rules, to confer
democratic legitimacy to the pervasive use of the treatise in the lower courts.
A. MoRE THAN AN ORACLE
Professor Hovenkamp should be called the Oracle of Iowa City83 because
his ideas often anticipate rules and holdings adopted by courts and agencies.
If the treatise merely predicts the antitrust future, then its role in filling the
law vacuum would be relatively unproblematic. But if the treatise actually
81. Id. at so86.
82. See Metro Indus., Inc. v. Sammi Corp., 519 U.S. 868 (1996) (denying certiorari).
83. Cf Daniel A. Crane, Book Review, Antitrust Modesty, 105 MicH. L. REv. 1193, 1 193
(2007) (reviewing HOVENKAMP, supra note i) ("As custodian of the treatise, Hovenkamp speaks
with oracle-like authority on antitrust matters.").
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drives the antitrust future, then one must confront its legitimacy as lawgiver
in a context where more democratically legitimate-and perhaps more
expert-institutions are at least supposed to be operating. Although
conclusive proof of a causal link between the treatise and changes in Supreme
Court doctrine would be virtually impossible to prove, all signs point to the
treatise's power to influence, and notjust foreshadow, the Court's holdings.
i. Citation and Admiration
Perhaps most simply, it is clear that the members of the Court have read
the treatise and hold it in high esteem. This can be inferred from the
frequency of its citation in Supreme Court briefs,8 4 the Court's ubiquitous and
approving citations to it,85 and the comment by Justice Breyer about the
importance of the treatise to the practice of antitrust law.8 6 It seems doubtless
that the Court has a well-worn copy in its library.
2. Depth of Discussion
The treatise being read and respected is necessary to its being influential,
but it is not sufficient; thus, I must examine how the Court treats it in its
opinions. The high degree of attention that the Court gives to the treatise,
and the apparent flow of ideas from it to their opinions, suggests that the
Court uses the treatise for more than window dressing to their own ideas. Of
the 16 major antitrust cases decided since 2004, 1 1 cited the treatise. All 1 1
of these cases cited the treatise multiple times and reproduced direct
quotes-the average case quoted over 40 words from the treatise in the
opinion.S7 Thus, it is unsurprising that several key holdings of the Supreme
Court appeared first in the treatise.
84. According to Westlaw, the treatise has been cited in 265 Supreme Court briefs and 299
petitions for certiorari. These numbers are based on a search for [Areeda /4 (Hovenkamp OR
Turner)] in the databases "U.S. Supreme Court Petitions for Writ of Certiorari" and "U.S.
Supreme Court Briefs."
85. According to Westlaw, the treatise has been cited by the Court in 47 Supreme Court
cases. This number is based on a search for [Areeda /4 (Hovenkamp OR Turner)] in the "U.S.
Supreme Court" database.
86. See Breyer, supra note 3, at 89o.
87. SeeAm. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Fed. Trade Comm'n
v. Actavis, Inc., 13 3 S. Ct. 2223 (2o13); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (201 3 ); Fed.
Trade Comm'n v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1003 (2013); Am. Needle, Inc. v.
Nat'l Football League, 56o U.S. 183 (2010); Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 555
U.S. 438 (2009); Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007); Credit
Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Bell Ad. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Ill.
Tool Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2oo6); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2oo6);
Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S. 164 (2oo6); F. Hoffmann-La
Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus. (USA)
Ltd., 540 U.S. 736 (2004); Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540
U.S. 398 (2004).
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The Court's recent decision in fTC v. Actavis is illustrative.18 When the
Court decided Actavis in 2013, much academic ink had been spilled over the
status of so-called reverse-settlement payments (or pay-for-delay) in Hatch-
Waxman Act litigation, and a significant circuit split had emerged. A
comprehensive treatment of the market and regulatory forces that gave rise
to pay-for-delay settlements is beyond the scope of this Essay, but here I will
quote Justice Breyer's succinct summary of the problem from the opening
lines of Actavis:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the
claimed infringer, not to produce the patented product until the
patent's term expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B
many millions of dollars. Because the settlement requires the
patentee to pay the alleged infringer, rather than the other way
around, this kind of settlement agreement is often called a "reverse
payment" settlement agreement. And the basic question here is
whether such an agreement can sometimes unreasonably diminish
competition in violation of the antitrust laws.S9
The issue is treated comprehensively in paragraph 2046 of the Hovenkamp
treatise and, even more extensively, in other works by Professor Hovenkamp.
The treatise had been cited in lower court opinions addressing the
legality of pay-for-delay settlements,9o but it was the Supreme Court that gave
the treatise its starring role by citing it seven times in Actavis. And it is notjust
the number of citations (some of which are to more general issues of antitrust
law such as how "quick look" operates)9' but rather the fact that the Court
used an idea apparently pulled from the treatise to provide tangible guidance
to lower courts. The Court cited the treatise for the proposition that "the size
of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a
patent's weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed
exploration of the validity of the patent itself."92 In other words, the size of the
settlement provides the best proxy for its anticompetitiveness. By directly
incorporating that decisional factor into Supreme Courtjurisprudence-with
full attribution to Areeda and Hovenkamp, the Court seemed to be actually
influenced by the treatise, rather than merely using it to bolster the Court's
own reasoning process.
88. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2223.
89. Id. at 2227.
9o . Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 3 4 4 F. 3 d 1294, 1312 (1 1thCir. 2003) (quoting
12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 79, 2046, at 266, for the proposition that "some care
must be taken to ensure that ... the settlement ... is not more anticompetitive than a likely
outcome of the litigation" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
91. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237 (citing 7 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, 15o8, at
435-40).
92. Id. at 2236-37 (citing 12 AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 59, 2046, at 350-52).
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3. The Pressure to Cohere
Third, as a theoretical matter, if I am right that lower courts often use the
treatise to gap-fill where courts and agencies have been silent, then it may
have the effect of locking in the Court to its ideas. The FTAIA saga illustrates
the point well. At this point in the controversy, Professor Hovenkamp-
speaking through his treatise-has resolved the controversy in favor of the
notion that at least some international conduct is illegal per se under the
Sherman Act. Now that all circuits have come into line with the treatise, it
would be awkward for the Court to step in and decide on a contrary rule. Not
only would it be deciding an issue that is no longer a circuit split (the Ninth
Circuit having been corralled by the treatise), but it would also be disrupting
a hard-earned consensus among the lower courts that have more experience
in the trenches of international antitrust.93 Of course, not all ideas in the
treatise enjoy this level of prominence in the lower courts, but it illustrates
that when a secondary source of law has such a powerful influence on courts,
the tail can wag the dog.
B. HAVE THE AUTHORITIES RATIFIED THE TREATISE?
Although the Supreme Court does heavily rely on the treatise when it
decides an antitrust case,04 its docket limitations mean it must leave many
antitrust issues unresolved entirely.95 In these instances, which are the
majority of instances, it cannot confer its democratic and institutional
legitimacy on the lower courts' adoption of the treatise. By Professor
Hovenkamp's estimation, the Supreme Court decides less than two percent
of the important antitrust issues that arise in any given year.96 And although
the Court more often cites the treatise than not, there are several recent
antitrust cases that make no mention of the treatise at all.97
Perhaps, more fundamentally, if the Court wanted to confer authority on
the treatise in a wholesale manner, it should have to do so very explicitly. It
has not done this for the Hovenkamp treatise or any other secondary source
for obvious reasons. First, the Court simply could not anticipate that a
93. Such a disruption would not only be difficult to accept politically, but it also may be
irrational since there is now unanimity among the presumably diligent and intelligent legal minds
that have considered the issue. For an interesting discussion of how deference to lower court
consensus may be epistemically justified, see Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Following Lower-Court
Precedent, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. 851, 862-74 (2014).
94. See supra Part IV.A.
95. See supra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
96. See HOVENKAMP, supra note i, at 6. Professor Hovenkamp suggests that the circuits
decide "between fifty and eighty important antitrust cases per year," while the Supreme Court
since 2oo0 has heard on average about one antitrust case annually. Id.
97. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); Credit Suisse
Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007); Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood
Lumber Co., 549 U.S. 312 (2007); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1 (2oo6).
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secondary source could-in every possible instance now and in future
revisions-be an accurate reflection of the views of a diverse and changing set
ofjustices. Second, that delegation would be politically illegitimate and utterly
unpalatable to the public.9S
Nor have the agencies made any such wholesale ratification. In agency
decisions, too, the treatise is very influential, but the overlap between agency
decisions and the substance of the treatise is not perfect. Additionally, for
reasons similar to why the Supreme Court has not adopted the treatise
wholesale, the agencies have retained their autonomy to part ways with the
Oracle of Iowa City at any turn.
C. THE TROUBLE WITH THE TREATISE'S AUTHORITY
Finally, it is perhaps important to ask whether this is all a lot of hand-
wringing for nothing. Some may argue that if the treatise is as excellent as I
claim in Part III, then there is nothing lost by it filling the law vacuum. To
these critics, it would seem that the treatise very comfortably stands in where
the authorities cannot overtly make law because of either practical or political
limitations. There is some force to this argument. Given that lack of antitrust
law from on high, we are undoubtedly in a better place than we would be
without the treatise. But the modifier "given the lack of antitrust law" is
important. There are sufficient problems with a single academic speaking for
the antitrust authorities that we ought to rethink the structural features that
have created the law vacuum in the first place and address the problem at its
roots.
Most fundamentally, Professor Hovenkamp's ideas lack democratic
legitimacy. When the Supreme Court writes, it speaks for a coalition ofjustices
that have been appointed by a President, confirmed by Congress, and exposed
to pervasive political and media scrutiny. Similarly, the agencies are
authorized by Congress, staffed by the President, and subject to a host of
oversight mechanisms including judicial review. In contrast, Professor
Hovenkamp must answer only to his reputation among his academic peers.
And while he is the most well-known scholar actively working in the antitrust
field today, his prominence cannot rival the Court or the FTC.
Further, there may be epistemological reasons to prefer antitrust law
emanating from the Court or the agencies than from Professor Hovenkamp.
The agencies have the benefit of a large staff of expert economists at their
disposal to lend expertise to its decision-making process.99 Agencies have the
ability to demand data from firms that can inform policymaking. The Court
may not formally have the same means to synthesize expert opinion, but it has
98. One could perhaps even raise the argument that such a delegation would run afoul of
the nondelegation doctrine. For an interesting discussion of the nondelegation doctrine outside
of the administrative law context, see generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially
Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405 (2oo8).
99. See Haw, Amicus Briefs, supra note 40, at 1264.
1937
IOWA LAWREVIEW
indirect access to many expert points of view through briefs from the solicitor
general and typically numerous amici. °°
Finally, Professor Hovenkamp brings to his treatise an academic
perspective on antitrust matters. Although we would all like to believe that the
academy is unbiased in its assessment of legal problems, inevitably we
approach problems and puzzles differently than elected politicians,
appointed bureaucrats, and governmental staffers. The compositions of the
agencies and of the Court indicate that the academic perspective is valued-
three of five FTC commissioners and five of nine Supreme Court Justices are
former law professors-...but in a mix with other professional backgrounds.
Having at least some decision makers with extensive practical, real-world
experience-be it with resolving actual cases and controversies, in firms, or
with the government-may improve antitrust decision-making.
V. INSTITUTIONAL REFORM TO ADDRESS THE LAW VACUUM
Somewhat counterintuitively, the dominance of the very fine Areeda-
Hovenkamp treatise may signal a failure of antitrust law. It highlights the need
for more and better guidance to firms trying to conform their conduct to the
law and to parties trying to optimize their litigation strategy. The problems
are institutional: Neither the agencies nor the Supreme Court are designed
to optimally regulate competition. Thus, the solutions are likewise
institutional. As I and others have argued elsewhere, the FTC should be
allowed and encouraged to engage in more notice-and-comment rulemaking
in addition to publishing guidelines.' °0 Articulating a fix on the Supreme
Court side is more difficult, since docket limitations are unavoidable and
high-level economic expertise from the bench is impractical. Still, some
facility with economics and statistics will assist the Court in making earlier and
better changes to antitrust law, and so should be encouraged among the
justices. But the Supreme Court's most tangible contribution will be to assist
the FTC in taking a stronger norm-creation role by granting deference to the
FFC's interpretations of both antitrust law and policy.
A. REFORMAT THE SUPREME COURT: RAISING THE BAR FOR ECONOMIC AND
STATISTICAL KNOWLEDGE
The Supreme Court has been slow to adjust competition law in response
to advances in economic theory and empirical research, leaving out-of-date
precedent on the books for longer than is optimal for antitrust regulation.l3
1OO. See generally id.
l1. Julie Brill, Maureen Ohlhausen, and Joshua Wright are FTC Commissioners with
academic backgrounds; Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan were law
professors before becoming Justices.
102. SeeCRANE, supra note 45, at 143; Crane, supra note 54, at 1199; Haw, Amicus Briefs, supra
note 40, at 1287-89.
103. See Haw, Delay, supra note 40, at 334.
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Prominent examples include the survival of the per se rule against resale price
maintenance well after economists had articulated significant procompetitive
arguments for its use.'0 4 Delay at the Supreme Court also means that the
antitrust consequences of new business practices, especially those that arise
because of changes in technology or regulatory regimes, can remain unclear
for a significant period of time.'0 5
The Court's relative lack of economic expertise contributes to its slowness
in these areas. The Court, without the scientific savvy to sift out the best
arguments from an existing debate about the competitive consequences of a
business practice, quite reasonably waits until all or most discord among
academics has been resolved. In other words, the Court waits for a consensus
among the experts to emerge-and sometimes, as in the case of resale price
maintenance, they wait for that consensus to age-before making a regulatory
shift in response. Because academic consensus can take decades to solidify,
and because the Court must take cases as they come and so may have to wait
further for the right case to petition for certiorari rather than affirmatively set
their regulatory agenda, the Court is a very slow regulator of competition.o 6
Although nothing practically can be done about the caseload problem
and about the fact that the Court cannot affirmatively set its regulatory agenda
but must choose among the cases petitioning for certiorari, some of the delay
may be alleviated by having economic and quantitative expertise on the
bench. Part of why the Court is so dependent on consensus and, thus, so slow
to adjust antitrust law to emerging economic arguments is because of its
relative inability to assess the scientific merits of those arguments without
resort to the general opinion of the academy.107 Some facility with economics,
quantitative thinking, and use of statistical and empirical models may help the
Court close the gap between the law and the science of antitrust. "Some
facility" need not mean a Ph.D. in economics; even weekend programs on
economics and modeling may improve the justices' economic expertise
enough to shorten the delay period. Perhaps more fundamentally, scientific
and social-scientific knowledge should be factored into the nomination and
confirmation process; inclination towards the scientific and quantitative
104. Another good example is the endurance of the market power presumption inferred
from patent protection. The legal presumption outlasted the economic theory behind it by
several decades.
05. One prominent example is the uncertainty that persisted, until the Court decided Actavis
last year, about the interaction of the Sherman Act and the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the legality of
pay-for-delay deals. Seegenerally Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
1o6. See Haw, Delay, supra note 40, at 356 ("For courts with selectivejurisdiction, like the Supreme
Court, the cases and controversies requirement slows the execution of any regulatory agenda by
forcing the Court to wait for an appropriate case presenting the issue in an ideal posture.").




should be thought of as part of the minimal qualifications of a Supreme Court
Justice in this era of data- and model-driven law.'
°8
But this solution is imperfect. First, more sophisticated judicial
engagement with economics will have at best an indirect effect on their
willingness to make more and better antitrust law. Other factors that impede
the Court's ability to act as an efficient regulator-the docket limitations, for
example-may overwhelm the small effect that increased expertise has on the
Court's antitrust jurisprudence. It may be that the Court's greatest
contribution to filling the law void in antitrust will be to grant the agencies a
higher degree of deference, which the next Subpart discusses.
B. REFORM AT THE FTC: NOTICE-AND-COMMUNT RULEMAKING AND DEFERENCE IN
THE COURTS
The best solution to the law vacuum is more norm creation by the
antitrust agencies, in particular the FTC. The FTC is better positioned than
the DOJ to make rules because it has statutory rulemaking authority under
the FTC Act and because the DOJ's prosecutorial pedigree more naturally
places it in the litigation sphere.-°9 But the FTC has little incentive to create
norms if it will not be granted Chevron deference by the courts because,
without that deference, courts will be free to substitute their own judgment
about antitrust policy for that of the FTC. Cases like Schering-Plough illustrate
that the courts tend not to be particularly generous about granting deference
to FTC interpretations of section 5.
But as Professor Crane points out in his piece advocating for more
antitrust norm creation at the FTC, the agency may have better luck receiving
Chevron deference for rules it creates through notice-and-comment
rulemaking.l ° The "rule" in Schering-Plough, although created "in a manner
that loosely mimicked the Administrative Procedure Act's requirements for
agency rule making"-exhaustive study and public comment-was created in
an adjudicative context."' This context made it especially easy for the
Eleventh Circuit to "castigate[]" the FTC for not following its precedent in
another dispute with similar facts.' A rule created through notice-and-
comment rulemaking-a decisional mode by definition unavailable to
io8. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Law and the Art of Modeling: Are Models Facts?, 103 GEO. LJ.
(forthcoming 2015) (manuscript at 59) (on file with author) ("But perhaps more fundamentally,
we need to rethink the criteria by which we select judges. The ubiquity of modeling in legal
disputes, and models' importance in allocating justice, redressing wrongs, and designing legal
rules, suggest that model competence should be a threshold criterion forjudicial appointment.").
1o9. See Haw, Amicus Briefs, supra note 40, at 1287-89 (arguing for the FTC to take over "the
responsibility of promulgating and enforcing antitrust rules" from the DOJ's Antitrust Division).
11 o. See Crane, supra note 54, at 1I2o8.
1 1 2. Id. at 120-ol.
112. Id. at lOl.
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courts-may allow courts to step aside and defer to the agency."3 The FTC
should test the waters by using its rulemaking authority under section 5 to
create norms that complement, but perhaps do not run afoul of, dominant
judicial interpretations of the Sherman Act.' ,4 And the Supreme Court should
be more generous in yielding to the norm-creating powers of the FTC because
it is so poorly positioned itself to provide the kind of specific guidance that
efficient competition policy requires.
VI. CONCLUSION
Professor Hovenkamp should be applauded for his tireless work in filling
the gaps left by the Court and by the antitrust agencies. Without his efforts,
lower courts and parties would be adrift in the academic controversies and
circuit splits that plague modern antitrust law. But the prominence of his
treatise-which is unique in all areas of law-evinces a hollowness at the core
of antitrust doctrine. Very few issues are considered by the antitrust
authorities, and too many doctrinal disputes endure for too long. But until we
solve the institutional limitations that impede lawmaking from on high, I for
one am glad we have Professor Hovenkamp at the helm.
1 13. Technically, the format of the rule making should not matter for deference purposes.
Professor Crane notes, "Arguably, the format of the Commission's rulemaking-whether
adjudicatory or legislative--should not matter to the deference question." Id. at 1 2o8. But he
points out that "going through a legislative rule-making process might help to refocus the
deference question by highlighting the FTC's administrative.., character." Id.
114. Professor Hovenkamp himself also advocates this idea. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Federal Trade Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REv. 871, 893-94 (2010).
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